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A Profession at an Inflection Point: 
Implications of Organizational-Professional Conflict among Valuation Service Providers 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In this study, whether a valuation-specific professional ideology exists and, if so, 
the consequences of valuation service providers’ (specialists, hereafter) association with that 
ideology. We specifically explore whether the alignment of specialists’ professional and 
organizational identities result in an identity conflict that we specify as organizational-professional 
conflict (OPC). Using a survey of 222 specialists with extensive valuation experience and who 
represent a cross-section of sub-specialties, organizational structures, and career paths to valuation, 
we identified four primary findings. First, consistent with our expectations, we find that OPC is 
highest (lowest) when specialists’ professional and organizational identities are both low (high) 
due to an identity conflict. Second, we find that specialists employed by private and public 
companies reported significantly higher OPC relative to specialists employed by either accounting 
or independent valuation firms. Third, we find that specialists who report lower versus higher 
professional identities and who primarily value financial instruments also reported significantly 
higher perceptions of OPC. We find no difference in professional attitudes among specialists who 
primarily value non-financial instruments. Lastly, supplemental analyses show that our 
professional ideology measure is robust to alternative specifications; that specialists who 
experience higher OPC were associated with more negative job outcomes such as higher turnover 
intentions; and that specialists at higher ranks reported lower OPC. Our study includes a discussion 
on implications of these findings for audit and financial reporting quality and should be of broad 
interest to specialists, auditors, financial statement preparers, regulators, and standards setters. 
Keywords: valuation specialists, fair value measurements, professionalism, organizational-
professional conflict 
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“Historically, the valuation profession hasn't been front and center in capital markets. The accounting model didn't 
have as many pieces measured at fair value as we have today. Some of the questions about the professional 
infrastructure [of the valuation profession] that didn't matter previously have become more apparent.” 
– John Glynn, U.S. Valuation Services Leader for PwC [2017]. 
I. Introduction 
Fair value accounting standards (e.g., ASC 820, IFRS 13) permit financial statement 
preparers (management, hereafter) to derive estimates for several classes of assets and liabilities. 
Because the knowledge required to develop estimates that comply with these standards often 
eludes both auditors and management, both rely heavily on experts (e.g., Kjellevold, 2018; Barr-
Pulliam, Joe, Mason, & Sanderson 2018). Reliance on experts is common in both auditing and 
financial reporting (e.g., Smith-Lacroix, Durocher, and Gendron, 2012; Cannon and Bedard, 
2016), but these standards elevated the need for and profile of a new type of expert—valuation 
practitioners (specialists, hereafter). Former Chief SEC Accountant Paul Beswick in a 2011 
speech; however, noted that valuation practitioners stand apart from other contributors to the audit 
and financial reporting processes (e.g., tax and information technology specialists) because they 
lack a unified professional identity. The opening quote from a valuation practice leader echoes this 
sentiment but suggests the larger concern is an insufficient infrastructure that governs entry to and 
the quality of specialists’ work. In this study, we use conventions of seminal professionalism 
research (e.g., Aranya & Ferris, 1984; Hall, 1968) to understand whether a valuation-specific 
professional ideology exists and, if so, consequences of specialists’ association with that ideology.1 
Accounting firms, other professional services firms, and both public and private companies 
with sufficient resources employ their specialists (e.g., PCAOB, 2015). The bureaucracy 
associated with these mostly hierarchical organizations and their exposure to regulatory oversight 
creates incentives for auditors and management to develop a compliance mindset during the audit 
                                                          
1 We define professional ideology as a manner of thinking that is characteristic of a particular group (e.g., valuation 
practitioners). We interchangeably use the term professional identity and intend for the latter to hold similar meaning. 
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and financial reporting processes, respectively. Specialists are important intermediaries in these 
processes, which places them in a unique position where they must balance desires to adhere to 
their evolving professional expectations and their employer’s demands. The latter we define as 
their level of organizational commitment. The valuation setting is unique because complex fair 
value measurements (FVMs) for financial instruments (e.g., collateralized debt obligations) 
require technical and tacit knowledge outside the accounting domain. Individuals with this 
knowledge often have non-business backgrounds, such as engineering and mathematics. 
Integrating these experts into highly-structured and compliance-driven environments presents 
concern over their ability to adapt to organizational demands while maintaining a commitment to 
professional standards (e.g., Suddaby, Gendron, & Lam, 2009; Wallace, 1995). As a result, we 
also explore whether employer type (work setting) and expertise domain (work context) moderate 
alignment of specialists’ perceptions of their professional and organizational identities. We define 
this alignment as organizational-professional conflict (OPC) (e.g., as in Aranya and Ferris, 1984).  
We highlight two important reasons why investigating OPC among specialists is important. 
First, Suddaby et al. (2009) suggest that changes to the nature and context of professional work 
ultimately change professional competence, attitudes, values, and other beliefs related to 
professionalism. The inherent complexity in deriving FVMs poses challenges for accountants, 
including management and auditors, that could lead them to question their knowledge and abilities 
(Gendron & Suddaby, 2004); and could engender professional insecurity which erodes trust in 
their system of expertise (Barrett & Gendron, 2006). Because accountants often rely on specialists 
to fill these fair value-related knowledge gaps, their insecurities create a source of vulnerability or 
an “access point” (Giddens, 1990) which in turn poses a jurisdictional threat over the production 
of FVMs (Griffith, 2019). The perceived disparity in knowledge domains drives these inter-
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profession tensions, especially when auditors are unwilling to integrate specialists fully into all 
phases of the engagement (e.g., Glover, Taylor & Wu, 2017; Cannon and Bedard, 2016). Similar 
tensions arise from management when they impose pressure to conform to biased reported values 
of FVMs that achieving earnings benchmarks that activate their incentives (Salzsieder, 2015). 
These pressures could exacerbate OPC and diminish audit and financial reporting quality.  
Second, organizations such as the AICPA and the IVSC2 have contemporaneous initiatives 
in place focused on the improving the professional infrastructure by infusing common features of 
established professions such as valuation-specific credentials and a professional practices 
framework (AICPA, 2017, 2018; IVSC, 2016). Both auditors and some specialists applaud these 
efforts because they establish consequences for low quality work and could better enable auditors, 
management, and specialists to collectively enhance the quality of financial results for their mutual 
stakeholders (e.g., EY, 2018; PwC, 2017). Other specialists caution that these initiatives could 
have unintended consequences for sub-specialties such as the valuation of financial instruments 
and could be less effective in organizations like accounting firms and non-financial services 
companies whose primary focus is not valuation (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019).  
We adapt the interactionist view of the system of professions (Abbott 1988) to develop 
predictions. This view suggests tacit knowledge and skill, in concert with structural changes in 
oversight of practitioners’ work, are factors that improve professional infrastructure and, in our 
setting, could help specialists carve out their niche within the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
production of FVMs. Prior research following this view finds a positive relation between 
professionalism and organizational commitment, and each has a negative relation with OPC (e.g., 
Aranya and Ferris, 1984; Iyer et al., 2018). When these perceptions are either both high or both 
                                                          
2 The International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC) is an independent, private sector standards setting 
organization that develops valuation-specific technical and ethical standards. 
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low, we expect an identity conflict to occur as these related, but distinct types of identification 
could direct individuals to engage in incompatible behaviors (e.g., Hekman et al. 2009; Baumeister 
1999). Further, we expect that OPC will be highest when perceptions of professionalism and 
organizational commitment are both low, we expect that OPC will be lowest when perceptions of 
both professionalism and organizational commitment are high and that values in other conditions 
will be intermediate. Professional service organizations like accounting and independent valuation 
firms formally promote high levels of professionalism and new employees engage in structured 
socialization processes (Covaleski et al. 1981) that emphasize uniformity of processes and 
consistently providing high-quality work products (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009). Alternatively, 
nonprofessional service firms and companies are more bureaucratic and place greater emphasis on 
organizational goals (e.g., Shafer et al., 2002a; Aranya and Ferris, 1984). Hence, we expect that 
accounting and independent valuation firm-employed (public and private company-employed) 
specialists will report lower (higher) perceptions of OPC.   
To test our predictions, we administered a field survey to 222 specialists who have 
extensive valuation experience, who represent each of the three work settings, and who represent 
both work contexts. The results of our analyses support our predictions and offer a snapshot of the 
existing professional ideology among specialists as well as potential implications for financial 
reporting and audit quality when strong interdependencies on experts exist. First, we find a 
significant interactive effect of professionalism and organizational commitment on OPC. We find 
that OPC is indeed highest when specialists report both low professionalism and low 
organizational commitment, lowest when specialists report both high professionalism and high 
organizational commitment, and intermediate in other conditions. Next, we show that work setting 
moderates the relationship between professionalism and OPC. In particular, we find that specialists 
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employed by private and public companies reported significantly higher OPC relative to specialists 
employed by either accounting or independent valuation firms. Lastly, we observe that work 
context moderates the professionalism – OPC relationship. We find that specialists who report 
lower levels of professionalism and primarily value financial instruments also reported 
significantly higher perceptions of OPC than the same specialists who reported higher levels of 
professionalism; however, these relationships do not occur among specialists who value non-
financial instruments. Supplemental analyses show that results hold when we substitute our 
measure of professional ideology with the Bamber & Iyer (2002) measure of professional identity 
used in prior accounting research (e.g., Iyer et al., 2018; Bamber & Iyer, 2007). Our additional 
analyses also suggest that higher perceptions of OPC result in lower job satisfaction and higher 
turnover intentions. Lastly and consistent with qualitative research examining specialists’ 
perceptions of their work with their clients (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al. 2018, Kjellevold 2018), we 
find that specialists who value financial instruments perceive higher OPC and lower job 
satisfaction than specialists who value non-financial instruments. Our findings related to the 
consequences of OPC such as higher intentions to leave the firm could have measurable effects 
such as further restrictions on the strained supply of high-quality specialists to meet the growing 
demand (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). Prior research also demonstrates that outcome effects like 
job satisfaction directly influence firm outcomes such as financial reporting and audit quality (e.g., 
Christen, Iyer, and Soberman, 2006; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, and Patton, 2001).  
 Our study answers the call of prior research to examine professional ideology in the 
context of a shock (e.g., fair value accounting standards) that was initially exogenous to but later 
creates a disturbance in a profession (e.g., Barbour and Lammers, 2015; Barley & Tolbert, 1997). 
The passage and implementation of fair value accounting standards also resulted in the formulation 
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of a new profession. Examining this new profession as it continues to evolve, allows us to draw 
on the discourse surrounding its development, such as the focused efforts on improving the 
professional infrastructure. We also take some preliminary steps toward understanding how 
disciplines related to and highly dependent upon accounting contribute to the accounting 
profession’s relative complexity—which is driven by macro-behavioral forces from regulators, 
standards setters, and its clients (e.g., Kalbers and Fogarty, 1995; Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001).  
 
II. Background and Hypotheses 
Valuation Practitioners’ Importance to Financial Reporting and Auditing Quality 
Fair value accounting standards released in the first decade of the 21st century, coupled 
with the concomitant explosive growth in financial statement accounts reported at fair value have 
given rise to a new market for valuation specialists. Because financial statement preparers 
(management, hereafter) and auditors typically lack valuation expertise, both rely heavily on 
specialists to assist them in preparing and evaluating fair value measurements (FVMs) of complex 
estimates that appear in the financial statements. The choice of specialist depends on the purpose 
of the valuation, the complexity of the underlying financial statement account, the complexity of 
the valuation process, the availability of competent in-house expertise, and the availability of data 
to determine necessary inputs and assumptions (Bratten et al., 2013; Joe et al., 2015).  
Management and auditors interact with specialists employed by one of three types of 
organizations: accounting firms, independent valuation firms, and public and private companies 
(PCAOB, 2015; Joe et al., 2015).3 Specialists provide FVMs across five broad categories for 
                                                          
3 We use the terms “employed” and “engaged” as depicted in PCAOB Staff Consultation Paper 2015-01 and discussed 
in Joe, Janvrin, Barr-Pulliam, Mason, Pitman, Rezaee, Sanderson, & Wu (2015), to refer to specialists employed by 
the firm to which they provide valuation services. Engaged specialists may be employed by any type of firm and may 
act as independent third-party consultants to both auditors and managers. 
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financial reporting purposes: business entities, financial instruments, tangible assets, intangible 
assets, and real estate (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). Accounting firm specialists primarily evaluate 
the reasonableness of FVMs for or as a part of an audit engagement team. However, in a pure 
consulting role, others engage accounting firm specialists also 1) prepare FVMs for non-audit 
clients of their firm and 2) evaluate the reasonableness of an FVM for other accounting firms. 
Independent valuation firms’ (independents, hereafter) specialists have a similar dual role as 
engaged specialists that prepare FVMs for management or evaluate the reasonableness of FVMs 
for auditors. Accounting and auditing independence standards (e.g., ASC 820; PCAOB 2018) 
preclude independents from both preparing an FVM for management then later evaluating the 
reasonableness of that same FVM for management’s auditor. Public and private companies (in-
house specialists, hereafter) employ specialists who only prepare FVMs for management but also 
assist in governance roles within the firm that are related to valuation (PCAOB, 2015).   
Extant accounting research has examined how specialists interact with both auditors and 
management, and this research notes specific challenges that cause points of contention in each 
setting (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2018; Hux, 2017). Many of these challenges arise from regulatory 
pressure on auditors and management to improve documentation and to demonstrate their 
competence related to the FVM process and the quality of the FVMs (e.g., PCAOB, 2015). Other 
challenges concern the timeliness of engagement of specialists by auditors and expectations gaps 
between specialists and their clients (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2018; Kjellevold, 2018). Additionally, a 
perceived shortage of high-quality specialists exists to prepare and or evaluate some types of 
FVMs (e.g., financial instruments) (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). Common reasons cited for the 
perceived shortage include lack of a commonly recognized career path, lack of a uniform set of 
skills and credentials, and fierce competition to recruit and retain practitioners within the pool of 
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specialists considered highly qualified. Collectively, these challenges could affect the extent to 
which specialists encounter and how they navigate conflict with their employers and with their 
clients, which include auditors and management. Whereas prior studies examine characteristics of 
the valuation process; or client, task and regulatory factors that affect specialists’ decision-making 
(e.g., Hux, 2017; Cannon and Bedard, 2016; Bratten et al., 2013), this study examines the effects 
of the professional context in which specialists practice and the resulting consequences on their 
work behavior. We examine, at this important moment in the evolution of the valuation profession, 
how reliance on experts that lack a centralized oversight body and professional practices 
framework affects how these professionals perceive their work. A framework specifically 
“enhances the consistency and transparency in the performance of FVMs,” to the benefit of the 
public interest (AICPA 2018) and quality monitoring program further help to increase confidence 
that credential holders perform high-quality valuations (AICPA 2017, 2018). The quality of FVMs 
has direct but currently unobservable implications for audit and financial reporting quality.  
Organizational Commitment (OC) 
In this study, we define organizational commitment [OC] as an individual’s (1) strong 
belief in and acceptance of his or her employer’s values and goals, (2) willingness to work hard 
for the organization, and (3) desire to maintain membership in the organization” (Mowday, Steers, 
and Porter, 1979, 226). This definition follows the organizational behavior approach to examining 
the implications of practitioners’ identification with their employer (e.g., Shafer, 2002; Aranya 
and Jacobson, 1975). Early research (e.g., Steers, 1977) finds an element of exchange equity that 
occurs when individuals come to organizations with specific desires and skills and expect that the 
organization will satisfy these needs in exchange for the tacit knowledge, skills and expertise (e.g., 
Bonner, 1990) they possess and that is desired by the organization. Applied to our setting, the 
changes mentioned above in fair value-specific accounting standards and auditing standards (e.g., 
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ASC 820; PCAOB, 2018) influence the need for both financial statement preparers and auditors, 
respectively, to employ or engage valuation specialists because the level of expertise required for 
many FVMs exceeds their available expertise.  
When organizations effectively integrate employees’ skills, and the employee also 
perceives that the organization satisfies his or her needs, OC is enhanced (Steers, 1977). 
Alternatively, OC diminishes when employees perceive that they have unmet needs due to an 
inequitable exchange with the organization (Steers, 1977). For example, higher OC is positively 
associated with a desire to remain employed to the organization and negatively associated with 
turnover intentions (e.g., Koch and Steers, 1978). These relationships pose significant implications 
for the stability in the workforce and are a predictor of employee effort and performance (Mowday, 
Porter & Steers 1982; Angle & Perry, 1981). This research suggests reliance on specialists who 
perceive higher OC could improve FVMs thereby improving financial reporting and audit quality.    
An alternative view of commitment to the organization used in some contemporaneous 
research (e.g., Iyer et al., 2018) focuses on a related but conceptually different construct—
organizational identification (as defined by Bamber and Iyer 2002). This research derives its 
denotation and application of organizational identification from social identity theory (Tajfel 1978; 
Tajfel and Turner 1979). Like OC, organizational identification focuses on practitioners’ 
perception of aligning of organizational values and goals with their own (e.g., Turner 1984). 
Unlike OC, organizational identification also focuses on a sense of self and whether individuals 
perceive themselves as members of the organization. Strong organizational identification, 
however, could make practitioners more susceptible to the social influence of leaders in the 
organization, potentially biasing their judgment (e.g., Iyer et al. 2018; Hekman, Bigley, Steensma 
and Hereford 2009; Bamber and Iyer 2002, 2007). OC is apropos in our valuation setting because 
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it captures how a willingness to work hard for the organization could lead to conflict when OC is 
aligned or misaligned with specialists’ professional ideology, discussed in the next section. 
Professionalism as an Ideology 
Abbott (1988) indicates that the “essence of a profession” is its work product rather than 
the organization, that “many variables affect the content and control of that work,” and that, 
“professions exist in an interrelated system” (Abbott 1998, p. 112).  This interactionist perspective 
of professionalization aptly describes the relationship between accountants and specialists and 
indicates that changes in jurisdictional work boundaries can change professions (Griffith, 2019). 
This approach also indicates that the development of new knowledge and skill as well as structural 
changes in the execution of the task are two critical factors that can change jurisdictional 
boundaries. Increased use of FVMs in accounting requires accountants to consider their beliefs 
about historical cost accounting and shifts jurisdictional work boundaries because management 
and auditors must rely on specialists to help produce and audit the financial statements (Hux, 2017; 
Cannon and Bedard, 2016; Smith-Lacroix et al., 2012). Therefore, as a first step in understanding 
how the ascension of fair value prescriptions might affect the accounting profession, it is important 
to understand the antecedents and consequences of professionalism among specialists. This 
understanding is important because these specialists are crucial to the production of FVMs. 
Further, their inclusion challenges accountants’, especially auditors’, control over the services they 
deliver. Our study fills a gap in the existing literature and provides a foundation for future studies 
examining the evolution of the accounting profession in a valuation setting. 
Prior professionalism research takes either an institutional or an individual level approach. 
Institutional level research in accounting focuses on factors such as whether accounting as an 
occupation meets traditional sociological definitions of a profession (e.g., Mautz, 1988; Zeff, 1987; 
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Burns and Haga, 1977) and evaluating organizations employing accountants from a functional, 
interactive or critical perspective (e.g., Abbott 1988; Wilmott, 1989; Hooks, 1991). This research 
typically measures perceptions of professionalism among a group of related or unrelated 
occupations (e.g., Hall, 1968; Snizek, 1972) or specific to one occupation such as public 
accounting (e.g., Norris and Niebuhr, 1983; Aranya and Wheeler, 1986; Goetz et al., 1991; Lander, 
Koene & Linssen, 2013), internal auditing (Iyer et al., 2018; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1995), and 
management accounting (Shafer, Park, and Liao, 2002b). The consensus among this research is 
that researchers should focus on a single group of professionals because idiosyncrasies across 
professions could cloud researchers’ ability to make clear inferences from their findings (e.g., 
Barbour & Lammers, 2015; Bartol, 1979). Prior research taking an individual-level approach 
focuses on practitioners’ perceptions of various elements of professionalism and typically 
examines the association between these perceptions and individuals’ work behaviors (Lander et 
al., 2013), or how increased professionalism might conflict with higher levels of commitment to 
an individual’s employing organization (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009). We follow the individual level 
approach and focus on each of the three primary employers of specialists. We extrapolate from the 
interactionist professionalization literature describing the professionalism effects of dividing 
expert labor (Abbott, 1998) and use two dominant theses to develop our predictions related to the 
joint effects of organizational and professional identities—proletarianization vs. adaptation. 
The proletarianization thesis describes the professional work environment of large 
organizations and applies more so to those organizations that specialize in professional services 
such as accounting and independent valuation firms (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009). This thesis 
originates from Marx's theory of history, which contends there are two opposing models of 
professionalism–the bureaucratic and the idealized.  Under both models, professionalism among 
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employees is relatively higher, compared to organizations following the adaptation thesis, because 
of the focus on uniform processes and high quality. In the bureaucratic model, the intrinsic 
characteristics of capitalism (e.g., focus on efficiency) eventually erode workers efforts to the 
status of the “proletariat” (Freidson, 1986). That is, workers will be reduced to the market value 
of their labor as firms partition their work into routine parts void of control over the process and 
substance of their work. Partitioning into parts occurs through the implementation of specialized 
and formalized role structures (e.g., Wallace 1995). The bureaucratic model erodes professional 
values over time as well as the commitment to the employing organization (e.g., Suddaby et al., 
2009) and in our setting best describes accounting firms. However, qualitative studies find that 
individual professionals employed by accounting firms are subject to a series of socialization 
practices designed to align professional and organizational goals and which constrain professional 
judgment in a variety of more or less subtle ways (Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian and Samuel, 1998).  
Contrary to the bureaucratic model, in the idealized model, professionals are assumed to 
have the requisite skills and knowledge to perform their work and are accorded wide latitude and 
discretion to determine when and how to perform their work (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009; Wallace, 
1995). The idealized model increases attitudes towards professionalism over time, which tends to 
crowd out commitment to commercial and managerial pursuits of the employing organization 
(Suddaby et al., 2009). This model best describes independent valuation firms in our setting. 
Similar to accounting firms, independent valuation firms have a focus on uniformity and high 
quality. However, because specialists are the dominant coalition in an independent firm (e.g., 
Dirsmith, Heian and Covaleski, 1997), their relatively higher autonomy could encourage creativity 
in meeting client needs and result in higher satisfaction and less perceived conflict with the 
organization in their role during the production of FVMs.     
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The “adaptation” thesis differs from proletarianization and suggests that individuals can 
adjust to work environments in large organizations by creating real or imagined barriers that, 
effectively, form mini-professional service firms inside the organization that protect them from 
bureaucracy inherent in organizational control (e.g., Cooper & Robson, 2006). This view also 
suggests that the mini-professional service firm structure allows practitioners to maintain their 
professional values while also engendering strong commitment to the employing organization in 
a way that decreases conflict between professional expectations and bureaucracy (Suddaby et al., 
2009). Recent quantitative research in accounting generally finds more support for the adaptation 
thesis (Shafer, Lowe & Fogarty, 2002a; Bamber & Iyer, 2002) finding limited conflict between 
employees’ commitment to their profession and their organization. In our setting, this model best 
describes public and private companies that employ specialists. Concerns related to whether 
specialists are a dominant coalition (e.g., in financial services companies and independent 
valuation firms) could impose constraints on adaptation (e.g., Covaleski et al., 1998; Dirsmith et 
al., 1997); however, contemporaneous research in accounting suggests professionals adapt 
relatively well to large organizations and are able to maintain dual commitment to their profession 
and organization. We examine whether that duality holds among specialists.  
Professionalism, Organizational Commitment and Organizational-Professional Conflict (OPC) 
This juncture in accounting and auditing practice creates an ideal setting to examine the 
joint effects of professionalism and organizational commitment on specialists’ interactions within 
their institutions (e.g., their employers). Specialists often have non-traditional backgrounds, which 
is particularly germane to the production of more complex FVMs (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019), but 
serve an important role within traditional settings that are the financial reporting and auditing 
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gatekeepers such as in accounting firms.4 One example of an institutional interaction is 
Organizational-Professional Conflict [OPC], which is an affective response either to the alignment 
or misalignment between organizational and professional demands. Whereas accounting standards 
have long espoused the application of historical cost accounting with standardized approaches to 
valuing accounting transactions, fair value accounting introduces significant judgment and 
estimate uncertainty requiring the application of complex valuation methodology, and the 
evaluation of subjective assumptions about unobservable model inputs (FASB 2011, ASC 820; 
Griffith et al. 2015; Bratten et al. 2013).  
Historical cost accounting lies in stark contrast to the application of complex valuation 
models and input assumptions exercised in the development of estimates of fair value. 
Consequently, prior research finds the disparity in knowledge domains and approaches the 
accounting (i.e., using historical cost accounting) and valuation (i.e., using fair value accounting) 
practices use to value financial reporting transactions are a significant source of disagreement 
between these two constituents and are a source of conflict between the parties (Griffith, 2019; 
Cannon & Bedard, 2016; Griffith et al., 2015). Whereas specialists might desire the freedom to 
exercise professional judgment with minimal intervention or reprimand either externally or 
internally (Shafer et al., 2002a; Barr-Pulliam et al., 2018; Hall 1968), their decisions are 
constrained by the tenets prescribed in accounting standards and by the accounting organization 
leading to OPC.  
Research finds that OPC varies across professional settings of employing organizations. 
On the one hand, organizations emphasize adaptation to core values and goals, focus on profit 
                                                          
4 We consider accounting firms as gatekeepers of audit quality since audits of public and private companies are 
performed by these firms. We consider the public companies, especially, as the gatekeepers of financial reporting 
quality.  Specialists, however, may be employed by either of these types of firms, as well as independent valuation 
firms. However, they play an important role in maintaining high levels of audit and financial reporting quality. 
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maximization, and loyalty (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009; Shafer et al., 2002a; Meyer & Allen, 1984). 
On the other hand, professional practice frameworks generally emphasize professional autonomy, 
independence in fact and appearance (e.g., objectivity), and high standards of conduct and high-
quality work products (Hall, 1968). Both professionalism and OC are negatively associated with 
OPC (Sorensen, 1967; Aranya & Ferris, 1984). However, no prior research directly examines 
professionalism among specialists or their institutional interactions.  
Early multidisciplinary studies find a negative relationship between professionalism and 
OPC (e.g., Snizek, 1972; Hall, 1968) while some subsequent studies focusing on one occupation 
find a positive relationship (e.g., Shafer et al., 2002b). Measurement error and nuances in the 
experimental setting examined in these subsequent studies explain the differential effect of 
professionalism. One way specialists might experience OPC is a conflict between adherence to 
professional practices related to the production of FVMs and budget and time pressure (Hux, 
2017). Currently, no one professional certification or its professional practices framework is 
preeminent among specialists (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). We expect varying levels of 
professionalism among practitioners. However, if contemporaneous efforts to move the practice 
of valuation toward a more professional model are successful and if attitudes toward 
professionalism follow the preponderance of prior research and are more positive, ceteris paribus 
the adaptation thesis could be more likely to manifest.5 We develop the following expectation:  
H1: Specialists’ perceived professionalism is negatively related to perceptions of OPC. 
 
As previously indicated, organizational commitment describes attitudes embodying strong 
involvement and identification with the employing organization, a willingness to work hard and 
                                                          
5 The contemporaneous efforts to which we refer are development of valuation-specific certifications for business and 
intangibles valuation (Certified in Entity and Intangible Valuations—CEIV) and financial instruments (Certified in 
the Valuation of Financial Instruments—CVFI) by the American Institute of Public Accountants (AICPA) to assuage 
this concern. We discuss implications for our results and in the conclusion.   
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remain employed with an organization. Further, high organizational commitment is associated 
with acceptance of the goals of the organization, strong attachment, and loyalty to the organization 
(Bartol, 1979). Given these prior findings, we expect where specialists’ values align with that of 
their organization, and they indicate a high commitment to their employing organization, they will 
experience lower levels of OPC. Conversely, we expect a lower commitment to the employing 
organization will be associated with higher levels of OPC.6 Examining OC among specialists could 
provide additional insights into institutional implications of challenges noted by both specialists 
and their clients during the production of FVMs such as communication, time pressure, and 
expectations gaps (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019; Hux, 2017). We also expect a negative 
relationship between OC and OPC, formally stated as follows: 
H2: Specialists’ perceived OC is negatively related to perceptions of OPC. 
 
While we predict two main effects in the first two hypotheses, we also expect that OPC 
will be conditional upon the alignment or misalignment of specialists’ perceptions of 
professionalism and organizational commitment. In one view, specialists could experience an 
identity conflict whereby they have both higher (lower) perceptions of professionalism and OC, 
because these two different but related types identification could direct individuals to engage in 
incompatible behaviors (e.g., Iyer et al. 2018; Hekman et al. 2009; Baumeister 1999). Aranya and 
Ferris (1984) describe a more nuanced expectation that results when there is an identity conflict. 
Specialists operating in environments promoting high levels of professionalism and that have a 
formalized socialization process (e.g., as described by Covaleski et al. 1981) that often leads to a 
high commitment to the organization will likely experience the lowest OPC. In these 
                                                          
6 Aranya and Ferris (1984) and other studies suggest that organizational commitment (OC) could also be a behavioral 
outcome of OPC; however, other research suggests OC—and the related construct organizational identification as 
examined in Bamber and Iyer (2007), for example—could be an antecedent to OPC (e.g., Iyer et al. 2018). In our 
study, we take the antecedent approach for consistency with professionalism and test the alternative in Section IV. 
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environments, specialists will be more loyal to their organization and to executing the valuation 
task demonstrating higher levels of professional competence and objectivity. This association 
aligns with the adaptation thesis (Suddaby et al., 2009). Alternatively, specialists experiencing 
lower OC and who perceive lower professionalism will likely experience higher OPC.  
Prior research suggests that specialists employed in nonprofessional service firms (e.g., in-
house) are more likely to experience lower levels of professionalism compared to specialists 
employed in professional service organizations like accounting firms (Shafer et al., 2002a; Aranya 
and Ferris, 1984). Further, specialists employed in bureaucratic environments are more likely to 
experience lower levels of OC because of the associated dissatisfaction and frustration 
professionals experience when working in such environments (Suddaby et al., 2009). Therefore, 
we expect that specialists who experience lower OC and who have more negative attitudes about 
professionalism will perceive the highest levels of OPC, which leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3a:  Specialists will perceive low (high) OPC when they report both higher (lower) 
professionalism and organizational commitment. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
When specialists experience no identity conflict, for example, when they report a 
combination of higher OC-lower professionalism or lower OC-higher professionalism, they should 
experience moderate OPC.7 Some professionalism research in accounting argues that OC may be 
a function of professionalism, suggesting that the latter precedes the former (e.g., Aranya, Pollock 
and Americ, 1981). This logic then suggests that absent an identity conflict, OPC will be higher 
when professionalism is lower irrespective of the level of OC. Other OPC research suggests the 
two constructs develop independently (e.g., Iyer et al., 2018; Suddaby et al. 2009; Shafer et al., 
2002b; Kalbers and Fogarty 1995) and this research suggests no clear distinction which 
                                                          
7 Consistent with Aranya and Ferris (1984), we define moderate as between the highest and lowest levels of OPC.  
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“moderate” OPC setting is higher. Because of the nuances in our valuation-specific setting and 
because of the current professionalization efforts by the AICPA and other organizations (AICPA, 
2017, 2018), we develop our hypotheses following the latter research stream:   
H3b:  Specialists’ perceptions of OPC will be intermediate when they report higher 
(lower) professionalism and lower (higher) organizational commitment. 
 
Effects of Work Setting and Work Context on Organizational-Professional Conflict 
An important assumption related to attitudes about professionalism its significant 
correlation with work behavior (e.g., Bartol, 1979). The preponderance of research suggests that 
beliefs about professionalism increase with demographic factors such as organizational rank 
(Wood et al., 1989; Harrell et al., 1986), the type of professional work, and the types of 
organizations with which specialists have experience (Suddaby et al., 2009; Shafer et al., 2002a). 
We examine how demographic factors that we categorize as work setting and work context 
moderate the relationship between specialists’ attitudes about professionalism and OPC. 
Specialists’ work setting examines whether experience in one of the three primary types of 
organizations that employ specialists (accounting firms, independent valuation firms, and public 
and private companies) affects specialists’ attitudes about professionalism. Prior research suggests 
the hierarchical structure, and institutional norms within both professional service firms and 
corporations offer the type of professional work that influences attitudes about professionalism 
and OPC (e.g., Leicht and Fennell, 2001). Important considerations are differences in ownership 
type and expertise of those in oversight positions between corporations and professional service 
firms which tend to be partnerships (e.g., Shafer et al., 2002a) and the extent to which specialists 
dominate the staffing configuration of the organization. 
In service-oriented professions such as accounting, medicine, and law, the corporate form 
often results in the loss of control over clients such as which clients to serve, which services to 
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provide, and fee structures. This organizational form also shifts the emphasis from the quality of 
service to organizational objectives such as cost containment and profit maximization (Shafer et 
al., 2002a). The implications for specialists employed by accounting firms and in-house could be 
similar as they are more likely to have a support role rather than function as the primary business 
line, such as in independent valuation firms. Auditors and bankers often control the workflow and 
revenue generation of specialists in their organizations. This limitation is especially salient for 
specialists employed by accounting firms since their existence and legitimacy centers around the 
need to support auditors in the evaluation of FVMs rather than generating revenue through the 
more profitable preparing FVMs for external non-audit clients (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019).     
Research in organizational behavior defines significant presence within the firm as 
dominant coalitions (e.g., Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Thompson, 1967) and suggests that 1) a 
"professionalism" coalition can exist at the macro level of the organization; 2) an "organizational" 
coalition can exist within a unit of the organization; or 3) the two coalitions could coexist. For 
example, in accounting firms, specialists may be dominant among the consulting practices, but 
auditors dominate the firm as a whole. This dynamic differs from independent valuation firms 
where specialists are typically the dominant coalition. Within both public and private companies, 
the primary industry (e.g., financial services) likely dictates not only whether specialists are a 
dominant coalition but also their specific importance to management. In our study, the extent to 
which specialists are a dominant coalition in their work setting could affect their attitudes about 
professionalism such that they moderate its effect on OPC. Work setting likely colors professional 
values and commitments, thereby influencing OPC, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4:  Work setting moderates the effect of professionalism on perceptions of OPC.  
Specialists’ work context examines whether valuing financial instruments (FI) versus 
either of the other four categories of FVMs (business entities, tangible assets, intangible assets, or 
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real estate), differentially affects attitudes about professionalism. While no definitive path to a 
career in valuation currently exists, Barr-Pulliam et al. (2019) find that the expertise, academic and 
professional training and complexity of FI specialists’ work requires a level of skill held by very 
few. Because of the structural and valuation complexity inherent in FIs, these specialists often hold 
PhDs in science or mathematics or hold advanced degrees from institutions offering quantitative 
finance and or financial engineering programs. Most non-FI specialists are CPAs with accounting 
and or auditing experience who, especially early in the development of valuation practices, 
transitioned into valuation from the audit practice in their accounting firm and either continued 
with the firm or moved to another employer (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). Because FI specialists are 
professionals with non-traditional backgrounds but who serve in important roles within traditional 
organizational settings, we expect differences in their attitudes about professionalism and thus the 
relationship between professionalism and OPC. Consequently, we form the following expectation:  
H5: Work context moderates the effect of professionalism on perceptions of OPC.    
 
I. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our study examines the relationships between and among specialists’ perceptions of 
antecedents to and potential outcomes of organizational-professional commitment (OPC). We 
administered a field-based survey which included three sections: a cover letter describing the 
purpose of the study and a request to signal informed consent; a series of scale-based instruments 
used in prior psychology, sociology and accounting research to measure our constructs of interest 
(see Appendix I); and optional demographic and classifying information.8 We pilot tested our 
survey with five global valuation practice leaders that represented each of the primary employer 
                                                          
8 We received all required approvals from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to administering the survey.  
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types for valuation experts (accounting and independent valuation firms and both public and 
private companies). Their helpful comments improved the external validity and mundane realism. 
To prevent order effects, we counterbalanced questions within and across the construct measures.9 
Participants 
Participants include specialists representing a range of backgrounds, services provided, 
employers, and geographic locations. We collected responses in person at continuing education 
conferences and online via Qualtrics. We distributed the paper surveys in person at valuation 
continuing education events sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; 
American Society of Appraisers; two State Societies of Certified Public Accountants; and the three 
Informa Valuation of Financial Instruments (V-FI) conferences. Events took place in either New 
York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, London, or Hong Kong, and we worked with program 
coordinators to identify participants. These coordinators facilitated distribution of the paper 
version of the surveys at the live events and were responsible for disseminating a Qualtrics link to 
their membership databases for the online version of the survey. This approach precluded our 
involvement in the recruitment process but increased confidentiality because we were unable to 
connect participant responses with any personally identifiable information. 
While we are unable to estimate the number of specialists who received but did not 
complete the survey online, we provided approximately 200 surveys to the coordinators for 
distribution at continuing education events. Two hundred forty-seven (247) specialists completed 
the instrument—75 in person and 172 online. We exclude 25 (10.12%) participants who provided 
                                                          
9 Consistent with prior professionalism research, we use a single source of data for our predictor and criterion variables, 
which subjects analyses to common method bias. In addition to counterbalancing presentation of measures, we also 
follow suggestions by Iyer et al. (2018) and Podsakoff et al. (2003) and (1) used an anonymous format; (2) encouraged 
honest answers based on how specialists generally felt, and assured them that there were no right or wrong answers; 
(3) used familiar terminology; and (4) used previously validated scales to operationalize constructs.  
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incomplete responses to one or more of the primary construct measurements (all were online 
participants). We include only 222 participants for consistency across analyses. In untabulated 
results, we find no systematic differences across collection methods (in-person versus online).10   
As we show in Panel A of Table 1, our sample includes specialists employed by each of 
the three primary organizational types: accounting firms (28.38%), independent valuation firms 
(45.05%), and in-house at public, private and financial services firms (26.57%). Panel B shows 
that participants are very experienced as a significant number have more than 15 years’ experience 
with their current employer (36.04%), specifically in valuation (63.51%), and overall (76.13%). 
Commensurate with tenure, 60.81% of our participants hold senior-level positions, and 50.45% 
have either current or prior accounting firm experience (both untabulated).  
Consistent with Barr-Pulliam et al. (2019) we differentiate FI from Non-FI in our study as 
the former refers to complex products such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and synthetic 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Panel C of Table 1 illuminates the lack of defined path as 
74.77% of participants have some non-valuation prior experience such as academia (13.96%), 
accounting (24.77%), and investment banking (12.61%). Panel D shows that participants primarily 
focus on FI (31.53%) and non-FI (64.47%). The business valuation sub-specialty of non-FI had 
the highest representation (40.99%).  
Panel E of Table 1 shows that valuation, like accounting, is a male-dominated occupation 
(Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019) as participants were 69.82% male. All participants have at least a 
bachelor’s degree while 49.10% have either a master’s or MBA and 5.41% have a Ph.D. Similar 
to the lack of a predefined path to a career in valuation and indicative of the current state of the 
valuation profession, practitioners and employers have mixed opinions about which certification 
                                                          
10 We find no systematic differences across our constructs of interest (PROF, OC, and OPC) or our work setting, work 
context, or other demographic variables such as age, gender, and experience.  
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is preeminent (Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). Panel E demonstrates this diversity of thought as 
common professional certifications reported include American Society of Appraisers (ASA: 
47.75%), Certified Public Accountant (CPA: 21.62%), Certified Financial Analyst (CFA: 
15.32%), Accredited in Business Valuation (ABV: 15.77%), and Certified Valuation Analyst 
(CVA; 15.77%). Thirty-two percent hold multiple certifications (e.g., CFA/ASA, CPA/ABV). 
Construct Measurement  
Professionalism 
Our first construct of interest is a professional ideology, which we operationalize as 
professionalism [PROF]. Following prior research (e.g., Shafer et al., 2002b; Kalbers and Fogarty, 
1995), we use the Hall (1968) Professionalism Scale, and we adapted it for a valuation-specific 
setting (see Appendix I). The scale represents the following five underlying dimensions: 
1) Professional community affiliation [e.g., I subscribe to, and systematically read, 
valuation-related and other relevant professional publications.], 
 
2) Social obligation [e.g., the valuation profession is essential to the welfare of society.],  
 
3) Belief in self-regulation [e.g., Valuation practitioners who violate professional 
standards should be judged by professional peers.],  
 
4) Dedication to the profession [e.g., I would stay in valuation even if I had to take a slight 
pay cut in order to do so.], and  
 
5) Demands for autonomy [e.g., The judgment of an experienced valuation professional 
should not normally be second-guessed by his or her supervisor].  
 
We used a 5-point scale anchored on whether each of 20 statements corresponds “very 
poorly” (1) or “very well” (5) with specialists’ attitudes and or behavior. For our analyses, we 
created a continuous Professionalism [PROF] score by summing scores across the 20 questions. 
We also created a dichotomous variable [PROF_Binary] that allows us to examine lower relative 
to higher PROF by splitting scores below or at or above the median, respectively. 
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The highest possible PROF score is 100, where higher scores indicate higher 
professionalism. As shown in Table 2 Panel A, the mean PROF score was 71.28, and the mean 
score is significantly greater than the scale midpoint of 60 (p < .001).11 Our PROF score is 
qualitatively similar to prior studies examining accountants (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009; Shafer et 
al., 2002b; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1995; Aranya and Ferris, 1984) and a range of other occupations 
such as engineers and social workers (e.g., Bartol, 1979; Kerr et al., 1977; Hall, 1968).12 
Organizational Commitment 
Our second construct of interest is organizational commitment [OC], which we measure 
following seminal work such as Meyer and Allen (1984) and more contemporaneous studies (e.g., 
Demirtas and Akdogan, 2015; Posey, Roberts, and Lowry, 2015). We include seven questions that 
measure specialists’ affective response to statements about their current employer such as “I do 
not feel emotionally attached to this organization” and “This organization has a great deal of 
personal meaning to me.” We used a 7-point scale anchored on whether specialists “strongly 
disagree” (1) or “strongly agree” (7) with each statement. As we did for PROF, we summed scores 
on each measure to create a continuous measure of OC and partition the sample into two groups 
by splitting participant scores below or at or above the median to derive OC_Binary. Higher scores 
indicate higher OC. Table 2 Panel B shows specialists averaged 33.93 of 49 points possible for 
                                                          
11 We calculate the scale midpoint for all of our measures using a 5-point (7-point) scale by multiplying three (four) 
times the number of questions on the measure (e.g., 3 x 20 for PROF). We test difference from the scale midpoint 
rather than the median since the midpoint is meaningful and because we make directional predictions.  
12 In untabulated analyses, we examined construct validity—based on Cronbach’s alpha ()—to examine the 
composite reliability of each measure. We find that our 7 measures, which include professionalism (PROF) [ = .69], 
organizational-professional conflict (OPC) [ = .63], organizational commitment (OC) [ = .69], turnover intentions 
(TOI) [ = .82], job satisfaction (JS) [ = .91], client identification (CID) [ = .87], and client image (CIM) [ = .89], 
exceed the recommended value of 0.60 and are within the recommended threshold of 0.70 suggested by Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006). We also performed principal components and confirmatory factor analyses for 
our constructs. Each measure was acceptable as it explains at least 60% of the variance and factor loadings were 
acceptable for PROF (ranging from .773 to .918 on the 5 components as well as for each of the 20 questions comprising 
the measure), OPC (ranging from .658 to .870), OC (ranging from .634 to .818), JS (ranging from .690 to .893), TOI 
(all above .900), CID (all above .800), and CIM (all above .800) (Hair et al. 2006).  
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OC, and the mean is significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 28 (p < .001). Values on our 
OC measure are consistent with prior research (e.g., Posey et al., 2015; Suddaby et al., 2009). 
Institutional Interaction 
We operationalize our third construct, institutional interaction, following Aranya and Ferris 
(1984) who developed an enhanced measure of organizational-professional conflict [OPC], also 
used by contemporaneous studies examining OPC among management accountants (Shafer 2002), 
public accountants (Bamber and Iyer, 2002), and internal auditors (Iyer et al., 2018). Our survey 
includes three questions that assess specialists’ perceptions of the interaction between their 
professional and organizational interests such as “I often have to choose between following 
professional standards and what is best for my organization” (see Appendix I). We used a 7-point 
scale anchored on whether specialists “strongly disagree” (1) or “strongly agree” (7) with each 
statement. We sum participants’ scores to create our continuous OPC variable and create a 
dichotomous variable [OPC_Binary] that allows us to examine lower relative to higher OPC by 
splitting participant scores that are either below or at or above the median, respectively.  
Specialists reported an average OPC score of 5.64 out of 21 total points possible. Table 2 
Panel C shows that the total mean score is significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 12 (p < 
.001). Though we use a 7-point versus a 5-point scale used in prior research focusing on auditors 
(e.g., Bamber and Iyer 2002; Iyer et al. 2018), our OPC score is qualitatively similar. This literature 
suggests that in professional service firms (e.g., accounting and law firms), the professional goals 
of employees tend to be directly proportional to the organization’s goals. The opposite exists in 
non-professional service work settings (e.g., industry, government, and public institutions) 
(Aranya and Ferris 1984). These proposed directions infer higher (lower) organizational and 
professional commitment in professional service firms (non-professional service firms), which in 
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turn could result in lower (higher) OPC. In our study, 163 (73.42%) participants reported 
employment by professional service firms (both accounting firms (28.38%) and independent 
valuation firms (45.05%)) while the remainder reported employment within non-professional 
service firms (See Table 1 Panel A). Consequently, we attribute our lower average OPC to the 
composition of survey participants but examine other factors such as rank and differences across 
work contexts, which help to replicate and extend this prior research (see Section IV below).   
Work Behaviors 
We measure work behaviors in three ways (see Appendix I), and for each measure, we 
used a 7-point scale anchored on whether specialists “strongly disagree” (1) or “strongly agree” 
(7) with a series of statements. As we did for prior measures, we summed scores on each measure 
to create our continuous job satisfaction [JS], turnover intentions [TOI], and client identification 
[CID] variables. Also, we similarly divided participant responses into two groups by splitting 
scores below (“lower”) or at or above (“higher”) the median on each respective measure. 
First, we measure job satisfaction [JS] following seminal work by Brayfield and Rothe 
(1951) and examined more recently in contexts that examine the association between job and 
marital satisfaction (Heller and Watson, 2005), the simultaneous effects of fit with jobs, groups, 
and organizations (Kristof-Brown, Jansen and Colbert, 2002), and the role of organizational 
leaders in employees' emotional experiences (Bono, Foldes, Vinson and Muros, 2007). Specialists 
answered seven questions that measure how positively or negatively they feel about their jobs. 
These questions also signal their perceptions of whether the job provides the fulfillment of a need 
or a want, or how well the job serves as a means of enjoyment.  Representative questions include: 
“I feel fairly well satisfied with my present job” and “I find real enjoyment in my work.” Table 2 
Panel D shows specialists averaged 39.86 of 49 total points possible for JS, and the mean is 
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significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 28 (p < .001). This finding is particularly interesting 
because qualitative studies that interview auditors (e.g., Griffith 2019; Jenkins, Negangard, and 
Oler 2018) and valuation specialists (Barr-Pulliam et al. 2018; Kjellevold 2018) suggest high 
dissatisfaction among specialists with their work. However, these qualitative studies focus 
primarily on the audit setting and specialists employed by accounting firms. Because we survey 
specialists broadly, in additional analyses, we can examine JS across work settings and work 
contexts to evaluate the consistency of prior findings with our survey findings.        
Next, we measure turnover intentions [TOI] following Shafer (2002) and Kalbers and 
Fogarty (1995). Specialists answer two questions that measure their intent to voluntarily leave their 
current employer over a short-term and a long-term horizon. The questions include: “I will 
voluntarily leave this organization within the next three years,” and “I will voluntarily leave this 
organization within the next six years.” Table 2 Panel D shows specialist averaged 5.58 of 14 
points possible for TOI, and the mean is significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 8 (p < .001). 
The average is largely consistent with Kalbers and Fogarty (1995) who use an internal audit setting. 
This finding, however, is also interesting because, as discussed above, if specialists have lower job 
satisfaction, we would expect them also to signal higher turnover intentions. In untabulated results, 
we indeed find a negative correlation between JS and TOI (Pearson Correlation = -0.41, p < .001). 
In Section IV we examine whether we identify differential TOI across work settings and work 
contexts that is consistent with the qualitative findings of prior research (e.g., Griffith 2019; Barr-
Pulliam et al. 2018; Jenkins et al. 2018) and answers the call for research that examines more of 
the nuances and richness across accounting settings (e.g., Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001).  
Lastly, following Bamber and Iyer (2007) and Suddaby et al. (2009), we measure client 
identification (CID). Our survey includes four questions that measure specialists’ affective 
 30 
 
reactions to statements about their primary client (e.g., auditors or management in our setting) such 
as “This client’s successes are my successes.” We also measure client image [CIM] which prior 
research uses to explain further how professionals view their clients (e.g., Svanberg and Öhman 
2015). This measure includes three questions such as “This client does not have a good reputation 
in the business community” and “The public thinks highly of this client.” Table 2 Panel D shows 
specialists averaged 14.95 of 28 total points possible for CID and 12.03 of 21 points possible for 
CIM. The mean is significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 16 (p < .009) for CID and not 
statistically different than the scale midpoint of 12 for CIM (p = .867). The averages for CID are 
similar to Bamber and Iyer (2007), and the mean for CIM is higher than that reported in prior 
research (e.g., Svanberg and Öhman 2015), most of which focus on auditors as participants. Barr-
Pulliam et al. (2018) suggest that the relationship between specialists and auditors is a “forced 
marriage” caused by accounting standards (e.g., ASC 820; IFRS 13). Kjellevold (2018) notes a 
similar sentiment for specialists and management. We examine these relationships in Section IV.  
Other Constructs of Interest 
We use self-reported demographic information from participants to proxy our work setting, 
work context, and experience constructs. Work setting focuses on the source of employment 
[EMP_TYPE] of each participant and includes accounting firms (Big4 and Non-Big4), 
independent valuation firms, financial services firms, and both public and private non-financial 
services firms. Work context focuses on the primary type of valuation each participant performs. 
We create an indicator variable [FI_SPECIALISTS] equal to one if specialists primarily value 
financial instruments (FI) and zero otherwise. Work experience focuses on specialists’ years of 
experience in valuation [YEARS_VALUATION] and with their current employer 
[YEARS_EMPLOYER]. We include participants’ rank within their firms [RANK] and follow Iyer 
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et al. (2018) who create an indicator variable equal to one if participants self-report titles at the 
senior manager or above level, zero otherwise. Lastly, we collect participants’ gender [GENDER]. 
 
II. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Professionalism, Organizational Commitment and Organizational-Professional Conflict 
 
Univariate Analyses and Replication of Prior Research 
We first examined the predicted relationships between and among professionalism 
(PROF), organizational commitment (OC), and organizational-professional conflict (OPC) using 
univariate analyses. Aranya and Ferris (1984) create an interaction term (PROF x OC) to 
categorize and predict the level of auditors’ OPC. We use a similar variable to examine our 
predictions related to when specialists experience an identity conflict versus no identity conflict. 
Consistent with Aranya and Ferris (1984), the correlation between OPC and the interaction term 
(PROF x OPC) in Table 3 Panel B is significant (p < .001) and negative (r = -0.24). This 
relationship and the pattern of means for OPC reported in Table 3 Panel A is consistent with the 
notion that an identity conflict, occurring when both PROF and OC are higher (lower), is 
associated with lower (higher) OPC. Also, the two no identity confliction conditions, occurring 
when either PROF or OC is higher, and the other is lower, fall between these endpoints, and we 
expect them to result in relatively moderate levels of OPC. Iyer et al. (2018) extend Aranya and 
Ferris (1984) and used linear regression rather than correlation analyses to test their hypotheses 
related to OPC. Consistent with Iyer et al. (2018), Table 3 Panel B shows significant (p < .001) 
and negative correlations between PROF and OPC (r = -0.23) as well as between OC and OPC (r 
= -0.23). The pattern of mean OPC across levels of PROF and OC are qualitatively similar to 
Aranya and Ferris (1984) and Iyer et al. (2018). Next, we discuss our multivariate analyses.    
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Multivariate Analyses and Extension of Prior Research 
We estimate a linear regression in Table 3 Panel C that includes our primary constructs of 
interest (PROF and OC) as predictors and OPC as the dependent variable. In our analyses, we use 
the binary measures of PROF and OC for ease of interpretation of results. We also include 
specialists’ work setting (EMPL_TYPE), work context (FI_SPECIALISTS), self-reported title 
(RANK), and gender (GENDER) as control variables. Each of these control variables is significant 
and in the expected direction in the overall model except for gender. We also find nuances in the 
significance of some of the control variables across work setting.      
Recall that in H1, we predict that OPC will be lower (higher) when specialists report higher 
(lower) PROF. We find that mean OPC is lower when PROF is higher (5.03) relative to when 
PROF is lower (6.29) (Table 3 Panel A). Overall regression results in Panel C show a significant 
negative coefficient on PROF (b = -0.22, t = -2.38, p < .001). This result provides support for H1, 
suggesting that mean OPC is indeed lower (higher) when PROF is higher (lower). Our results are 
consistent with prior professionalism research (e.g., Iyer at al. 2018; Suddaby et al. 2009), which 
finds that adherence to professional standards, ceteris paribus, could decrease OPC.    
Similar to H1, we predict a negative relationship between OPC and OC in H2. Specifically, 
we expect that OPC will be lower (higher) when specialists report higher (lower) levels of OC. 
We find support for H2 as Panel A of Table 3 shows that mean OPC is indeed lower when OC is 
higher (4.46) relative to when OC is lower (6.89). Overall regression results in Panel C further 
support our expectation as the coefficient on OC is negative (b = -0.38) and significant (t = -4.04, 
p < .001) and the result is consistent with prior research examines OC as an antecedent to OPC 
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(e.g., Bamber and Iyer 2002). This result suggests a greater commitment to the organization, 
ceteris paribus, could also decrease OPC. 13 
Our predicted interaction (related to potential identity conflicts) suggests three ordered 
outcomes based on the joint effects of PROF and OC on OPC. As a result, we use contrast coding 
to test H3a and H3b. First, recall that H3a predicts specialists will perceive the highest relative 
OPC when they report an identity conflict resulting in both low PROF and low OC. Panel A of 
Table 3 shows that the highest mean perceived OPC occurs when specialists also signaled less 
positive (lower) attitudes about PROF and lower OC (7.38). Contrast tests in Panel D support our 
prediction that perceived OPC is indeed highest in this Low  PROF – Low OC setting relative to 
the other three settings (t = 5.05, p < .001). Second, as predicted in H3a, Panel A also shows that 
the lowest mean perceived OPC occurs when specialists report an identity conflict based on both 
high PROF and high OC (4.32). Results in Panel D further support our prediction as OPC is lowest 
in this High PROF – High OC setting relative to the other three settings (t = -3.94, p < .001).  
H3b predicts that perceptions of OPC will be moderate when no identity conflict exists. 
We perform three sets of comparisons to test this prediction. First, results in Panel C show that 
OPC is lower in the Low PROF – High OC setting than it is in the Low PROF – Low OC setting 
(t = -4.46, p < .001) and no different than the High PROF – High OC setting (t = 0.59, p = .556). 
Second, results in Panel C show that perceived OPC is lower in the High PROF – Low OC setting 
than it is in the Low PROF – Low OC setting (t = -1.98, p = .025) and higher than the High PROF 
– High OC setting (t = 3.15, p < .001). Finally, we examine but make no ex-ante prediction about 
whether Low PROF – High OC or High PROF – Low OC results in higher OPC. Panel D shows 
that OPC is higher in the High PROF – Low OC setting (t = -2.29, p = .017). Collectively, these 
                                                          
13 In untabulated results, we test and find evidence that OPC mediates the PROF – OC relationship (p < .001). We 
used Model #4 in PROCESS (Hayes 2012) and our results also provide support for the behavioral outcome approach.    
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findings support prior OPC research and indicate specialists’ perceptions of OPC is higher when 
OC is low irrespective of the level of PROF (e.g., Suddaby et al. 2009).  
The Moderating Role of Specialists’ Work Setting 
In H4, we predict that work setting (EMPL_TYPE) moderates the effect of PROF on OPC. 
Consistent with the PCAOB Staff Paper (2015) and contemporaneous practice in valuation, the 
three primary work settings are either external (accounting and independent valuation firms) or in-
house (public and private companies). We first examine differences across work settings by 
estimating the regression used to test H1, H2, and H3 for each of the three work settings. Results 
in Table 3 Panel C are largely consistent with the previously discussed overall results except for 
the accounting firm setting. For specialists employed by accounting firms, results support neither 
H1 (which predicted a main effect for PROF) nor H2 (which predicted a main effect for OC); 
however, the results support H3 (t = -2.13, p = .023). 
Using the PROCESS Macro in SPSS (Hayes 2012), we ran a moderation analysis to 
examine H4 further. Like the regression results, we find a significant PROF x EMPL_TYPE 
interaction (t = -2.09, p = .038, untabulated). Figure 2 shows that differences between lower and 
higher PROF reported by specialists employed by accounting firms (t = -1.65, p = .05, untabulated) 
and in-house (t = -3.74, p < .001, untabulated) drive this relationship. Also, in-house specialists 
reporting lower PROF reported significantly higher OPC relative to the accounting and 
independent firm specialists (t = -4.15, p < .001). These results are consistent with prior research 
that finds professionals employed in firms that use the corporate business form (e.g., specialists 
employed in-house) are more likely to experience lower levels of professionalism compared to 
specialists employed in professional service organizations like accounting firms, this, in turn, leads 
to higher OPC (Shafer et al., 2002a; Covaleski et al. 1997; Aranya and Ferris, 1984).  
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[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
The Moderating Role of Work Context 
 Recall that H5 predicts that specialists’ expertise in either financial instruments (FI) or non-
financial instruments (Non-FI) moderates the effect of PROF on OPC. Similar to our test of H4, 
we first examine whether differences exist across specialists’ expertise by estimating the 
regression used to test H1, H2, and H3 by type of expertise. Untabulated results show a main effect 
of PROF on OPC among FI specialists (t = -2.50, p = .015) but no main effect among Non-FI 
specialists (t = -0.30, p = .764). While this result partially supports H5, we use the PROCESS 
Macro in SPSS (Hayes 2012) to directly examine the moderating effect of expertise on the 
relationship between PROF and OPC. Results suggest a significant PROF x FI_SPECIALISTS 
interaction (t = -3.29, p = .001, untabulated) and that the interactive effect is only significant among 
FI specialists (t = -4.03, p < .001, untabulated). Figure 3 graphically represents these relationships. 
These results provide empirical evidence to support qualitative findings that specialists’ 
backgrounds and expertise quality of institutional interactions. These studies suggest more strained 
interactions for FI specialists relative to Non-FI specialists (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019). 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
Supplemental Analyses 
We conduct three categories of additional analyses. In the first category of analyses, we 
examine the robustness of our professionalism measure by replacing it with an identity measure 
developed for an accounting-specific setting. The second category explores a research question 
that observes the effect of OPC on specialists’ perceived work behaviors. The purpose of the third 
category is to contextualize our findings by examining where significant differences occur across 
our work setting, work context, and experience demographic measures.  
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An Alternative Measure of Professional Ideology 
Contemporaneous studies examining professional ideologies in accounting the accounting 
context (e.g., Iyer et al. 2018) focus on professional identification [PROFID]. These studies argue 
that PROFID is a direct measure of identity rather than an attitude about professional work. We 
focus on professionalism in our study because the five underlying factors (see Appendix 1) help 
us to understand what potentially drives this behavior more so than identity alone. We examine 
PROFID in these additional analyses to rule it out as a potential alternative explanation for our 
primary results and to more directly test the assertions in accounting-specific professionalism 
research. We measure PROFID (see Appendix I) following Bamber and Iyer (2002) and create 
both a continuous and binary measure similar to our other constructs. Confirmatory factor analysis 
identifies one factor that explains 65% of the variance, and the scale has high composite reliability 
(α = 0.86). Untabulated results show a positive correlation between PROFID and PROF (p < .001). 
We next reexamine our hypotheses whereby we replace PROF with PROFID. Results 
(untabulated) are consistent with the primary findings. We do, however, find when we partition 
our sample by work setting (e.g., employer type), the interaction (H3) is insignificant among 
accounting firm specialists. This result is consistent with the beforementioned onboarding 
processes in accounting firms who strongly promote alignment of professional and organizational 
identities (Covaleski et al. 1998, 1981) to decrease the likelihood of OPC.  
The Effect of Organizational-Professional Conflict on Specialists’ Work Behaviors 
The second category of analyses both replicates and extends prior research in accounting. 
Results appear in Table 4. We estimated a linear regression with OPC as the primary predictor; 
work setting (EMP_TYPE), work context (FI_SPECIALISTS), and RANK as control variables; and 
each of the three work behaviors [job satisfaction (JS), turnover intentions (TOI), and client 
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identification (CID)] as the dependent variable. We replicate findings of prior research (e.g., 
Sorensen and Sorensen, 1974) that find higher OPC leads to lower job satisfaction (t = -6.55, p < 
.001) (e.g., Harrell et al. 1986) and higher turnover intentions (t = 2.78, p = .001) (e.g., Shafer et 
al. 2002b). The comparisons across our specialist-specific work setting and work context variables 
extend the research as mentioned above, examining implications of OPC to a new context. Lastly, 
our finding that OPC is lower, but not statistically different, when CID is higher also extends prior 
OPC research (e.g., Landau et al. 2013). Within the framework of our study, we do not find that 
higher OPC leads to higher CID since such identification could raise objectivity concerns.  
Differences across Work Settings, Work Contexts, and Experience Levels 
In the last category of additional analyses (see Table 5), we separately examine specialists’ 
attitudes about PROF, OC, OPC, and our three work behavior measures within each work setting 
(Panel A), work context (Panel B), and experience level (Panel C). In our previous discussion of 
OPC, we predicted lower OPC for specialists employed by non-professional service firms (in-
house to public and private companies in our study) relative to specialists employed by 
professional service firms (accounting and independent valuation firms in our study) (Shafer et al., 
2002a; Aranya and Ferris 1984; Covaleski et al. 1997). In this analysis, we use this binary 
categorization of our three sources of specialist expertise. Panel A of Table 4 shows a pattern of 
means that is consistent with expectations of higher PROF (71.66), higher OC (34.39) and lower 
OPC (5.45) among specialists employed by professional services firms relative to specialists 
employed by non-professional service firms. However, these means only differ for OC (t = 1.73, 
p = .086, two-tailed) and OPC (t = -1.94, p = .054, two-tailed), which further supports H2 and H3.  
Examining means across work behavior measures, we find that specialists employed by 
professional services firms reported higher JS (40.17), higher TOI (5.63), lower CID (14.51) and 
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lower CIM (11.92) compared to specialists employed by non-financial services firms. Only CID 
is significantly different (t = -1.83, p = .069, two-tailed) but this result is consistent with the fact 
that specialists employed by non-professional services firms likely provide valuations exclusively 
for their employer, which in turn could lead to higher CID. We expect based on prior qualitative 
research (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2018; Kjellevold 2018), but cannot test based on how we 
collected data in this study, differences in and implications for CID among accounting firm 
specialists. These specialists, in many cases, assist both auditors and management in the production 
of FVMs, though not for the same client. When evaluating the reasonableness of FVMs, extant 
auditing research finds that auditors tend to over-rely on their employed specialists and, in some 
cases, valuations provided by management’s specialist (e.g., Cannon and Bedard, 2016; Bratten et 
al., 2013). This over-reliance could raise both independence and objectivity concerns for auditors 
and specialists. We encourage future research to examine this further.      
Next, Panel B of Table 5 shows the pattern of means across specialists’ expertise domain 
(FI vs. Non-FI). We find that FI specialists reported lower PROF (68.20), lower OC (33.21), and 
interestingly higher OPC (6.53) relative to Non-FI Specialists. The means only differ across 
expertise for PROF (t = -1.61, p = .090, two-tailed) and OPC (t = 2.75, p = .006, two-tailed). These 
findings provide additional support for H5 and suggest that lower PROF, rather than OC, as 
suggested in the overall analyses, drives the joint effect on OPC among FI specialists. We also 
show that FI specialists reported lower JS (38.61), interestingly lower TOI (5.46), higher CID 
(15.74) and lower CIM (11.66) compared to Non-FI Specialists. Means only differ for JS (t = -
1.70, p = .091, two-tailed) but this result is consistent with findings in qualitative research (e.g., 
Barr-Pulliam et al. 2018; Kjellevold 2018) which find that specialists in general express 
dissatisfaction with their jobs, which could have negative effects on audit and financial reporting 
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quality. We contribute to this research by providing empirical evidence to suggest that FI 
specialists experience low job satisfaction (compared to non-FI specialists) which can have 
deleterious effects on the subjective valuations they perform for financial reporting purposes. The 
finding also suggests another dimension to the measurement risk inherent in complex estimates 
such as FVMs (e.g., Griffith et al., 2015; Bratten et al., 2013). We encourage future experimental 
research that more directly examines the association between specialists’ attitudes such as job 
satisfaction and the effect(s) on job performance (e.g., as suggested by Judge et al., 2001) and firm 
outcomes (e.g., Christen et al., 2006) such as financial reporting and audit quality. Important 
moderators of the relationship include perceptions of autonomy, performance rewards, and mood.    
Lastly, Panel C of Table 5 shows the pattern of means across specialists’ rank (Lower 
[below Senior Manager] vs. Higher [Senior Manager and above]). Not surprisingly, we find that 
higher-ranking specialists reported higher PROF (71.55), higher OC (35.23) and lower OPC (5.06) 
relative to lower-ranking specialists (p < .001 for OC and OPC). Relatedly, we find that higher-
ranking specialists reported higher JS (40.94), lower TOI (5.22), and lower CID (14.29) compared 
to lower-ranking specialists (p < .01 for JS and TOI). These results are consistent with prior 
research that suggests that experience (and rank) significantly influences not only professionalism 
but also work behaviors and institutional interactions (e.g., Suddaby et al., 2009; Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1995). However, because accounting firms tend to hire specialists at higher ranks to 
activate higher levels of pay that make them competitive with financial services institutions and to 
some degree independent valuation firms (e.g., Barr-Pulliam et al., 2019), untabulated results show 
no differences across rank for any of the constructs. Differences are significant and in the expected 
direction for independent valuation firms and some constructs among specialists employed in-
house. We encourage future research that examines these factors in more depth.      
 40 
 
III. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine factors considered antecedents to and outcomes of 
organizational-professional conflict (OPC) and that influence the professional infrastructure of 
specialists. We examine these interrelationships at a juncture where organizations such as the 
AICPA and the IVSC have implemented new valuation-specific professional certifications and 
professional practices frameworks. The stated goal of these initiatives is to improve the quality, 
consistency, and transparency of specialists’ work products (AICAP 2018, IVSC 2016). Increasing 
quality will help to build investor and regulatory confidence because holders of these new 
credentials will also be subject to a centralized quality monitoring program from an organization 
with enforcement power (AICPA 2017, 2018). 
We identify four important findings from surveys completed by 222 highly experienced 
specialists who represent a cross-section of sub-disciplines in valuation and who represent each of 
three primary sources of valuation expertise. First, the joint effects of professionalism and 
organizational commitment result in an identity conflict that leads to higher (lower) OPC when 
specialists report lower (higher) perceptions of both. Second, we find evidence that the type of 
employer affects specialists’ perceptions of their professional ideology, which in turn affects 
whether they perceive OPC. Next, we find that specialists who value financial instruments report 
a lower professional ideology compared to specialists who value non-financial instruments. These 
specialists also perceive the highest OPC. Lastly, our results both replicate and extend prior 
research examining outcome effects of OPC. Consistent with prior research, we find outcome 
effects of higher OPC such as lower job satisfaction and higher turnover intentions among 
specialists. We contribute to knowledge and supplement qualitative research findings in Barr-
Pulliam et al. (2018) and Kjellevold (2018) with our finding of no association between OPC and 
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how specialists identify with their clients. This finding implies that specialists value independence 
and objectivity in their approach to the production of FVMs.   
Our study is subject to limitations inherent in survey research, such as comment method 
bias. We also examine the relationships between and among professionalism, organizational 
commitment, OPC, and work behaviors before the implementation of the aforementioned 
valuation-specific credentials and the framework of the professional practice. We encourage future 
research to examine whether these efforts, in particular, improve professionalism among 
specialists. The timing of our study and its results provide useful insights for management, 
auditors, regulators, and others with a vested interest in improving the quality of FVMs reported 
in the financial statements in the immediate future while the professionalization efforts previously 
mentioned evolve and take hold. Future research that replicates our study can provide evidence of 
whether the effects we identify are temporary or enduring. Further, this research could serve as a 
post-implementation review of the effectiveness of professionalization efforts.  
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TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS  
 
PANEL A: Source of Employment 
Source of Employment Frequency Percent 
Accounting Firm 63 28.38 
Independent Valuation Firm 100 45.05 
In-House (e.g., Financial Services, Public or Private Company) 59 26.57 
Total 222 100.0 
*In supplemental analyses, we report frequencies and examine differences within each source of employment.  
 
PANEL B: Professional Tenure of Specialists 
Tenure 
With Current 
Employer 
Valuation 
Experience 
Total Professional 
Experience 
N 
% of 
Total N 
% of 
Total N 
% of 
Total 
Less than 5 years 62 27.93 21 9.46 9 4.05 
More than 5 but less than 10 years 51 22.97 32 14.41 22 9.91 
More than 10 but less than 15 years 29 13.06 28 12.61 22 9.94 
More than 15 years 80 36.04 141 63.51 169 76.13 
Total 222 100.00 222 100.00 222 100.00 
 
PANEL C: Specialists’ Non-Valuation Experience 
Prior Non-Valuation Experience (Any Type) Frequency Percent 
None 56 25.23 
Yes 166 74.77 
Academia 31 13.96* 
Accounting/Auditing 55 24.77 
Investment Banking/Structuring 28 12.61 
Portfolio Management                    15          6.76 
Risk Management                    13          5.86 
Sales/Trading/Credit/Financial Analyst                    22          9.91 
Other                    72        32.43 
*Specialists reported multiple types of experience which results in total frequencies greater than 222, but all percentages out of 222 total participants.  
 
PANEL D: Specialists’ Primary Valuation Focus 
Valuation Focus Frequency Percent 
Financial Instruments [FI Specialists]      70 31.53 
Non-Financial Instruments [Non-FI Specialists]     152 68.47 
     Business Valuation 91 40.99 
     Forensic Analysis & Expert Testimonial 14 6.31 
     Mergers & Acquisitions 5 2.25 
     Estate Planning 1 0.45 
     Purchase Price Allocations 12 5.41 
     Tax Valuation 12 5.41 
     Other 17 7.66 
Total      222 100.0 
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TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS, continued 
 
PANEL E: Gender, Education and Certifications 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Gender   
Female 52 23.42% 
Male 155 69.82 
Other or Prefer not to answer 15 6.76 
Highest Degree Obtained   
Bachelor’s (including B.S./B.A./B.B.A) 81 36.49% 
Master’s (including M.S./M.A.) 44 19.82 
MBA 65 29.28 
PhD 12 5.41 
Other 20 9.01 
Certifications   
American Society of Appraisers (ASA) 106 47.75 
Accredited in Business Valuation (ABV) 35 15.77 
Certified Business Appraiser (CBA) 11 4.95 
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 34 15.32 
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) 11 4.95 
Certified Management Accountant (CMA) 4 1.80 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 48 21.62 
Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA) 35 15.77 
Financial Risk Manager (FRM) 5 2.25 
Certification (Other) 62 27.93 
*Specialists reported multiple certifications which result in total frequencies greater than 222; however, all percentages out of 222 total participants.  
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF LATENT and INDICATOR VARIABLES 
 
PANEL A: Professionalism Measure Mean Midpoint Std. Dev. p-Value
*
 
Professionalism [PROF] – Overall Score 71.28 60.00 9.06 < .001 
Professional Community Affiliation 15.29 12.00 3.39 < .001 
I subscribe to, and systematically read, valuation-related and other professional publications. 4.00 3.00 1.07 < .001 
I regularly attend and participate in meetings of local, regional, and/or international professional 
organizations and conferences…. 3.74 3.00 1.23 < .001 
I often engage in interchange of ideas with valuation professionals from other organizations. 3.72 3.00 1.22 < .001 
I believe that more valuation professionals should support the IVSC, AICPA, CFA Institute and other 
professional organizations’ initiatives related to valuation. 3.83 3.00 1.07 < .001 
Social Obligation 14.36 12.00 3.34 < .001 
The valuation profession is essential to the welfare of society. 3.59 3.00 1.15 < .001 
The importance of the valuation of financial instruments is sometimes overstated. 3.27 3.00 1.09 < .001 
Not enough people realize how vital the valuation profession is. 3.70 3.00 1.10 < .001 
Any weakening of the role of the valuation profession would be harmful to the public. 3.79 3.00 1.10 < .001 
Belief in Self-Regulation 14.63 12.00 2.52 < .001 
Valuation practitioners who violate professional standards should be judged by their peers. 4.18 3.00 0.92 < .001 
Valuation practitioners have no reliable way of judging each other’s competence. 3.53 3.00 1.21 < .001 
One centralized organization should have the power to enforce standards. 2.79 3.00 1.36 .024 
One valuation practitioner is a better judge of another than a non-valuation practitioner would be. 4.13 3.00 1.00 < .001 
Dedication to the Profession 15.04 12.00 2.83 < .001 
I am gratified when I see the dedication of my fellow valuation practitioners. 4.10 3.00 0.91 < .001 
It is encouraging to see a valuation practitioner who is idealistic about his or her work. 4.09 3.00 0.89 < .001 
It is difficult to be enthusiastic about the kind of work that I do. 3.68 3.00 1.35 < .001 
I would stay in valuation even if I had to take a slight pay cut in order to do so. 3.16 3.00 1.17 .041 
Demands for Autonomy 11.96 12.00 2.52 .811 
Valuation practitioners should be given the opportunity to make decisions about policies that affect their 
work with both management and auditors. 3.97 3.00 0.90 < .001 
The judgment of experienced valuation professionals should not normally be 2nd guessed by a supervisor. 2.42 3.00 1.08 < .001 
The conclusions made by valuation professionals are rightly subject to review by their supervisor. 2.22 3.00 1.25 < .001 
Valuation professionals should be allowed to make significant valuation-related decisions without the 
intervention of those outside the department. 3.34 3.00 1.14 < .001 
*Unreported t-Statistic was used to test the difference of the mean from the scale midpoint (one-tailed p-value). 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF LATENT and INDICATOR VARIABLES, continued 
 
PANEL B: Organizational Commitment Measure Mean Midpoint Std. Dev. p-Value* 
Organizational Commitment [OC] 33.93 28.00 6.69 < .001 
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization. 5.76 4.00 1.74 < .001 
I do not feel “emotionally attached” to this organization. 5.64 4.00 1.79 < .001 
This organization has a great deal of personal meaning to me. 5.41 4.00 1.75 < .001 
I do not feel like “part of the family” at this organization. 2.25 4.00 1.61 < .001 
I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own. 4.60 4.00 2.01 < .001 
I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one. 4.60 4.00 1.77 < .001 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this 
organization be successful. 5.68 4.00 1.46 < .001 
 
PANEL C: Institutional Interaction Measure Mean Midpoint Std. Dev. p-Value* 
Organizational-Professional Conflict [OPC]  5.64 12.00 3.31 < .001 
My current employment situation gives me the opportunity to express myself fully as a 
professional. 2.05 4.00 1.45 < .001 
In my organization, there is a conflict between the work standards and procedures of the 
organization and my ability to act according to my professional judgment. 1.88 4.00 1.48 < .001 
I often have to choose between following professional standards and what is best for my 
organization. 1.72 4.00 1.26 < .001 
*Unreported t-Statistic was used to test the difference of the mean from the scale midpoint (one-tailed p-value). 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF LATENT and INDICATOR VARIABLES, continued 
 
PANEL D: Work Behavior Measures Mean Midpoint Std. Dev. p-Value* 
Job Satisfaction [JS] 39.86 28.00 7.43 < .001 
It seems that my friends are more interested in their jobs than I am. 5.52 4.00 1.58 < .001 
I feel fairly well satisfied with my present job. 5.70 4.00 1.31 < .001 
I definitely dislike my work. 6.20 4.00 1.44 < .001 
I feel that I am happier in my work than most other people. 5.37 4.00 1.32 < .001 
Most days, I am enthusiastic about my work. 5.63 4.00 1.18 < .001 
I like my job better than the average worker does. 5.70 4.00 1.19 < .001 
I find real enjoyment in my work. 5.73 4.00 1.20 < .001 
Turnover Intentions [TOI] 5.58 8.00 3.56 < .001 
I will voluntarily leave this organization within the next three years. 2.51 4.00 1.81 < .001 
I will voluntarily leave this organization within the next six years. 3.06 4.00 2.06 < .001 
Client Identification [CID] 14.95 16.00 5.94 .009 
When someone praises this client, it feels like a personal compliment. 4.22 4.00 1.60 .040 
When I talk about this client, I usually say, “We” rather than “they.” 3.54 4.00 1.89 < .001 
This client’s successes are my successes. 3.85 4.00 1.86 .234 
When someone criticizes this client, it feels like a personal insult.  3.34 4.00 1.70 < .001 
Client Image [CIM] 12.03 12.00 2.39 .867 
This client does not have a good reputation in the business community.  1.96 4.00 1.31 < .001 
The public thinks highly of this client.  5.26 4.00 1.41 < .001 
This client is considered one of the best companies to work for.   4.80 4.00 1.39 < .001 
*Unreported t-Statistic was used to test the difference of the mean from the scale midpoint (one-tailed p-value). 
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TABLE 3 
Professionalism, Organizational Commitment, and Organizational-Professional Conflict 
 
Panel A: Cell Means (Std. Err) [Sample Size] for Organizational-Professional Conflict  
Organizational Commitment 
[OC] 
Professionalism [PROF] 
Total Lower Higher 
Lower 
7.38 
(0.48) 
[64] 
6.18 
(0.57) 
[44] 
6.89 
(0.37) 
[108] 
Higher 
4.67 
(0.30) 
[43] 
4.32 
(0.27) 
[71] 
4.46 
(0.20) 
[114] 
Total 
6.29 
(0.34) 
[107] 
5.03 
(0.29) 
[115] 
5.63 
(0.22) 
[222] 
 
Panel B: Correlations  
 1  2  3 
1. Professionalism (PROF) 1     
2. Organizational Commitment (OC)      .215***  1   
3. PROF x OC (Interaction)      .661***  .667***  1 
4. Organizational-Professional Conflict (OPC)     -.225***  -.232***  -.243*** 
 
Panel C: Tests of Hypotheses 
  Work Setting 
VARIABLES 
Overall 
Accounting 
Firm Specialists 
Independent 
Firm Specialists 
 In-House 
Specialists 
CONSTANT 7.08***  4.56** 8.89*** 9.16*** 
 (7.21) (2.66) (7.64) (7.82) 
PROF_BINARY                    [H1] -0.22*** 0.06 -0.26** -0.32** 
 (-2.37) (0.33) (-1.88) (-2.00) 
ORG_COMM_BINARY       [H2] -0.38*** -0.17 -0.40*** -0.38*** 
 (-4.12) (-0.87) (-2.80) (-2.29) 
PROF x ORG_COMM         [H3] 0.19** -0.17** 0.28** 1.29* 
 (1.99) (-2.13) (1.69) (1.47) 
EMPL_TYPE 0.11**    
 (1.76)    
FI_SPECIALISTS 0.17*** 0.13* 0.06 0.39*** 
 (2.55) (1.36) (0.56) (2.92) 
RANK -0.22*** 0.03 -0.28*** -0.34*** 
 (-3.26) (0.22) (-2.56) (-3.25) 
GENDER -0.02 0.11 -0.06 -0.11 
 (-0.36) (0.77) (-0.56) (-0.94) 
Observations 222 63 100 59 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.20 0.28 0.47 
*Standardized regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) presented for each independent variable.  
*Binary measures derived by separating participants into lower (higher) for a score below (at or above) the median. 
*p-values calculated using one-tailed tests for all variables except EMPL_TYPE, and GENDER. Levels of significance 
include *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, and * p <0.1. 
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TABLE 3, continued 
Professionalism, Organizational Commitment, and Organizational-Professional Conflict 
 
 
Panel D: Planned Contrasts (Test of H3) – Overall  
Comparison 
Predicted 
OPC 
Value of 
Contrast 
Std. 
Error t-stat p-value 
I > All else (II, III, IV) High 6.94 1.38 5.05 <.001 
IV < All else (I, II, III) Low -5.26 1.33 -3.94 <.001 
      
(II, III) > IV ?? 2.21 0.09 2.247 <.001 
I > (II, III) ?? 3.89 1.01 3.85 <.001 
      
II < I Moderate -2.70 0.61 -4.46 <.001 
II > IV Moderate 0.35 0.59 0.59 .556 
      
III < I Moderate -1.19 0.60 -1.98 .025 
III > IV Moderate 1.86 0.59 3.15 <.001 
      
II = III ?? -1.51 0.66 -2.29 .017 
*All comparisons are one-tailed tests and results are qualitatively similar when we assume unequal variances. 
**Contrasts groups: 
 Low PROF – Low OC [I];  
 Low PROF – High OC [II];  
 High PROF – Low OC [III]; and 
 High PROF – High OC [IV] 
 
Variable Definitions: 
OPC_BINARY = DV, participants’ Organizational-Professional Conflict score divided into lower and higher; 
PROF_BINARY = participants’ overall Professionalism Score divided into lower and higher; 
ORG_COMM = participants’ Organizational Commitment score divided into lower and higher; 
EMPL_TYPE = 1 if employed by an accounting firm, 2 if employed by an independent firm, and 3 otherwise. 
FI_SPECIALISTS = 1 if the participant is a financial instrument (FI) specialist and 0 otherwise; 
RANK = 1 if participant self-reported current positions at or above the Senior Manager level and 0 otherwise; and  
GENDER = 1 if the participant is male and 2 if female.  
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FIGURE 1 
 
 Note: Higher (Lower) Professionalism = More positive (negative) attitudes about professionalism. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Organizational-Professional Conflict on Work Behaviors 
 
 Work Behaviors 
VARIABLES* Job Satisfaction Turnover Intentions Client Identification 
    
CONSTANT 42.40*** 6.87*** 14.63*** 
 (23.78) (7.30) (8.71) 
OPC_BINARY -0.43*** 0.20*** -0.05 
 (-6.55) (2.78) (-0.67) 
EMPL_TYPE 0.19 -0.12** -0.02 
 (0.29) (-1.70) (-0.28) 
FI_SPECIALISTS -0.08** -0.07 0.11* 
 (-1.63) (-0.89) (1.47) 
RANK 0.16*** -0.17*** -0.12* 
 (2.45) (-2.33) (-1.52) 
CIM   0.17*** 
   (2.36) 
    
Observations 222 222 222 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.24 0.18 
*Dependent variables for each model appear in each column.  
*To derive all binary variables, we separate participants into lower (higher) by splitting participant responses below 
(at or above) the median. 
*Regression coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) presented for each independent variable.  
*p-values calculated using one-tailed tests for all variables except EMPL_TYPE. Levels of significance include *** p 
<0.01, ** p <0.05, and * p <0.1. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
OPC_BINARY = participants’ total Organizational-Professional Conflict (OPC) Score divided into lower and higher; 
EMPL_TYPE = 1 if employed by an accounting firm, 2 if employed by an independent firm, and 3 otherwise; 
FI_SPECIALISTS = 1 if the participant is a financial instrument (FI) specialist and 0 otherwise; 
RANK = 1 if participant self-reported current positions at or above the Senior Manager level and 0 otherwise;  
CIM = participants’ Client Image Score. 
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TABLE 5: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 
PANEL A: Scale Scores across Employer Types [Work Setting – Examining Aranya and Ferris (1984)] 
Source of Employment 
(Sample Size) 
Professional Service Firms
*
 
(n = 163) 
Non-Professional Service Firms  
(n = 59) 
Difference in Means 
VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat** p-value 
Professionalism Score [PROF] 71.66 8.85 70.22 9.37 1.05 .296 
Organizational Commitment [OC] 34.39 6.69 32.64 6.60 1.73 .086 
Organization-Professional Conflict [OPC] 5.45 3.35 6.17 3.17 -1.94 .054 
Job Satisfaction [JS] 40.17 7.40 39.00 7.50 1.03 .303 
Turnover Intentions [TOI] 5.63 3.73 5.42 3.05 0.38 .701 
Client Identification [CID] 14.51 5.94 16.15 5.83 -1.83 .069 
Client Image [CIM] 11.92 2.40 12.32 2.37 -1.10 .270 
*Professional Service Firms include accounting and independent valuation firms. All other firms are considered non-professional service firms (e.g., in-house).  
**t-Statistic tests the difference of the mean between types. 
 
PANEL B: Scale Scores by Primary Valuation Focus [Work Context] 
Type of Specialist 
(Sample Size) 
FI Specialists 
(n = 70) 
Non-FI Specialists 
(n = 152) Difference in Means 
VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat* p-value 
Professionalism Score [PROF] 68.20 10.38 72.70 8.03 -1.61 .090 
Organizational Commitment [OC] 33.21 6.85 34.26 6.62 -1.08 .282 
Organization-Professional Conflict [OPC] 6.53 3.83 5.23 2.97 2.75 .006 
Job Satisfaction [JS] 38.61 8.49 40.43 6.84 -1.70 .091 
Turnover Intentions [TOI] 5.46 3.62 5.63 3.54 -0.34 .735 
Client Identification [CID] 15.74 5.47 14.58 6.13 1.36 .175 
Client Image [CIM] 11.66 2.63 12.20 2.27 -1.57 .118 
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TABLE 5: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES, continued 
 
PANEL C: Scale Scores by Lower vs. Higher Level Positions within the Firm [Experience Level] 
Rank within the Firm* 
(Sample Size) 
Lower 
(n = 59) 
Higher 
(n = 135) Difference in Means 
VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat* p-value 
Professionalism Score [PROF] 69.27 9.56 71.55 8.86 -1.61 .110 
Organizational Commitment [OC] 30.78 6.83 35.23 6.32 -4.40 < .001 
Organization-Professional Conflict [OPC] 7.07 3.60 5.06 2.77 4.23 < .001 
Job Satisfaction [JS] 36.90 8.59 40.94 6.53 -3.59 < .001 
Turnover Intentions [TOI] 6.68 3.77 5.22 3.36 2.67 .008 
Client Identification [CID] 15.63 6.18 14.29 5.66 1.47 .142 
*Dichotomous variable equal to 0 (1) if specialists reported current positions below (at or above) the Senior Manager level.  
*t-Statistic tests the difference of the mean between type. 
  
 59 
 
 
APPENDIX I: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
PROFESSIONALISM [based on Hall (1968)] 
 
Professional community affiliation: 
 I subscribe to, and systematically read, valuation-related and other accounting, scientific, and other 
professional publications 
 I regularly attend and participate in meetings of local, regional, and/or international professional 
organizations and conferences such as the IVSC, AICPA, CFA Institute, CFA Society, ASA, and 
the Valuation of Financial Instruments (V-FI). 
 I often engage in the interchange of ideas with valuation professionals from other organizations. 
 I believe that more valuation professionals should support the IVSC, AICPA, CFA Institute, and 
other professional organizations’ initiatives related to the valuation.   
 
Social obligation: 
 The valuation profession is essential to the welfare of society. 
 The importance of valuation is sometimes overstated [1]. 
 Not enough people realize how vital the valuation profession is. 
 Any weakening of the role of the valuation profession would be harmful to the public. 
 
Belief if self-regulation: 
 Valuation practitioners who violate professional standards should be judged by their professional 
peers. 
 Valuation practitioners have no reliable way of judging each other’s competence [1]. 
 One centralized organization (such as the AICPA, IVSC, or the CFA Institute) should have the 
power to enforce standards of valuation professionals. 
 One valuation practitioner is a better judge of another valuation practitioner than a non-valuation 
practitioner would be.  
 
Dedication to the profession: 
 I am gratified when I see the dedication of my fellow valuation practitioners. 
 It is encouraging to see a valuation practitioner who is idealistic about his or her work. 
 It is difficult to be enthusiastic about the kind of work that I do [1]. 
 I would stay in valuation even if I had to take a slight pay cut in order to do so. 
 
Demands for autonomy: 
 Valuation practitioners should be given the opportunity to make decisions about policies that affect 
their work with both management (as preparers of estimates) and auditors (as evaluators of 
estimates prepared by management). 
 The judgment of an experienced valuation professional should not normally be second-guessed by 
his or her supervisor. 
 The conclusions made by valuation professionals are rightly subject to detailed review by their 
supervisor [1]. 
 Valuation professionals should be allowed to make significant valuation-related decisions without 
the intervention of those outside the department. 
 
[1] = Item was reverse scored. 
*All items measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale anchored on whether the statement “very poorly” (1) or “very 
well” (5) corresponds with the participant’s attitudes and or behavior. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT [based on Meyer & Allen (1984)] 
 I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization [1]. 
 I do not feel “emotionally attached” to this organization [1]. 
 This organization has a great deal of personal meaning to me. 
 I do not feel like “part of the family” at this organization. 
 I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own. 
 I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one [1]. 
 I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this 
organization be successful. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL-PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT [Aranya & Ferris (1984)] 
 My current employer gives me the opportunity to express myself fully as a professional [1]. 
 In my organization, there is a conflict between the work standards and procedures of the 
organization and my ability to act according to my professional judgment. 
 I often have to choose between the following professional standards and doing what is best for my 
organization. 
 
JOB SATISFACTION [Brayfield & Rothe (1951)] 
 It seems that my friends are more interested in their jobs than I am [1]. 
 I feel fairly well satisfied with my present job. 
 I definitely dislike my work [1]. 
 I feel that I am happier in my work than most other people. 
 Most days, I am enthusiastic about my work. 
 I like my job better than the average worker does. 
 I find real enjoyment in my work. 
 
TURNOVER INTENTIONS [Kalbers & Fogarty (1995)] 
 I will voluntarily leave this organization within the next three years. 
 I will leave this firm voluntarily something within the next six years. 
 
CLIENT IDENTIFICATION [Bamber & Iyer 2002, 2007] 
 When someone praises this client, it feels like a personal compliment. 
 When I talk about this client, I usually say, “We” rather than “they.” 
 This client’s successes are my successes. 
 When someone criticizes this client, it feels like a personal insult.  
 
CLIENT IMAGE [Bamber & Iyer 2002, 2007] 
 This client does not have a good reputation in the business community.  
 The public thinks highly of this client.  
 This client is considered one of the best companies to work for.    
 
PROFESSIONAL IDENTIFICATION [Bamber & Iyer 2002, 2007] 
 When someone criticizes my profession, it feels like a personal insult. 
 When I talk about my profession, I usually say, “We” rather than “They.” 
 I am very interested in what others think about my profession. 
 My profession’s successes are my successes. 
 When someone praises my profession, it feels like a personal compliment.  
 
[1] = Item was reverse scored. 
*All items measured on a 7-Point Likert-type scale anchored on “strongly disagree” (1) or “strongly agree” (7). 
